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“IMPROBABLE ALLIES”
The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy EC-121 and U.S.-Soviet 
Cooperation during the Cold War
Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov
A U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane with 31 men aboard is reported 
missing in the Sea of Japan. The North Koreans are boasting that they 
have “shot down an American spy plane.” The information triggers a 
unique, massive, multinational sea and air search for possible survi-
vors of the EC-121. The cast includes improbable rescuers—Russian 
warships which happen to be in the area and volunteer their services.
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 On 15 April 1969, North Koreans were engaged in celebrating the birthday of Kim Il-sung, the founder and leader of the so-called Hermit Kingdom. 
However, the cheers quickly were replaced by the familiar shouts of “Down with 
U.S. imperialism!” and “Liberate the South!” when it was announced that a pair 
of MiG fighters had shot down a U.S. Navy (USN) EC-121 reconnaissance plane, 
which North Korea claimed had intruded into its airspace.1 The celebration of Kim 
Il-sung’s birthday (in this case, his fifty-seventh) was the nation’s most important 
national holiday: a day filled with festivals, artistic performances, sports competi-
tions, and academic seminars and debates. Freed from their daily routines, workers 
and students were in a cheerful mood as they carried banners and placards bear-
ing the image and slogans of their leader in the numerous parades held during 
the day. But the festive mood changed radically when the crowds became aware 
of early-evening bulletins announcing a “brilliant 
battle success.”2
The doomed EC-121 was an electronic intel-
ligence (ELINT) version of the Lockheed Super 
Constellation, a four-engine, propeller-driven, three-
hundred-miles-per-hour, unarmed aircraft.3 A bul-
bous radar dome (radome) on the top of the fuselage 
housed a special antenna capable of determining the 
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frequency of an adversary’s air-defense radar.4 EC-121 Big Look aircraft were tasked 
with conducting ELINT to intercept, locate, and record radar and communications 
emissions.5 Operating under the umbrella of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the specific aircraft in question had been assigned to take off from Atsugi, Japan, 
transit across the Sea of Japan to a point off the northern coast of North Korea, fly 
two and a half orbits, and land at Osan Air Force Base in South Korea.6
Following the attack, the United States put ships and planes en route to the 
site. But before they arrived, the Nixon administration requested foreign assis-
tance. Robert J. McCloskey, the chief State Department spokesman, stated that 
the United States had asked the Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea for any 
assistance they might render in helping to locate the plane’s missing crewmen. 
The requests were made in the capitals of the three countries.7
Owing to the EC-121 crash site’s proximity (about 150 miles south) to Vladi-
vostok—the main Far East naval base of the Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet—the first 
vessels on the scene were Soviet, not American. The first hard evidence that the 
EC-121 had gone down came the next morning when a USN P-3 rescue plane 
spotted debris two nautical miles northeast of the reported downing location; it 
consisted of such items as uninflated life rafts, paper, and dye markers.
A joint U.S.-Soviet search-and-rescue (SAR) operation began later that day 
when the rescue plane made contact with two Soviet ships in the vicinity of the 
downed plane. That afternoon, aided by American rescue-aircraft personnel who 
dropped identifying smoke bombs, the Soviet destroyers began to pick up debris 
from the downed aircraft.8
Although the ships at sea picked up pieces of the spy plane and assorted debris 
and the downed plane reportedly had carried enough life rafts to hold the entire 
crew, no survivors were spotted from the air.9 Despite the lack of confirmed 
reports of survivors, the size of the rescue operation was being “substantially 
expanded” at that time, the Pentagon said.10
Sometime after the shootdown, Captain Wayne Whitten, U.S. Marine Corps 
(USMC), who had flown several missions with EC-121 aircraft in the Gulf of 
Tonkin during the Vietnam War, took a phone call from Secretary of Defense 
Melvin R. Laird. At the time, Whitten was in Hawaii on a watch team at the Joint 
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) at the headquarters of the commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, at the time Admiral John S. McCain Jr.11 “It was really confusing[,] 
with reports first of Soviet ships going to the crash site and no one sure if they 
were going to help or hinder,” Whitten later recalled. Secretary Laird had heard, 
erroneously, that there were survivors. Whitten was the one who had to give the 
Secretary of Defense the sad news: all on board the EC-121 had perished.12
The joint U.S.-Soviet SAR operation that unfolded over four days became a 
rare example of cooperation between traditional Cold War adversaries. The June 
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/9
 1 0 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
1969 issue of Air Reservist magazine, the official publication of the Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve, described them as “improbable allies.”13
With the passage of over fifty years since the North Korean downing of this 
EC-121 in the Sea of Japan, much has been written on the topic, both in books 
and in academic journals. But no works previous to this article have relied so 
heavily on declassified congressional reports, documents obtained through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contemporaneous press reports, and the 
testimony of former Soviet participants, nor have others delved so deeply into the 
surprising role the Soviet navy played during this joint SAR operation.
This article tells the story of the EC-121 incident, with an emphasis on the par-
ticipation of the Soviet navy. Those whom the authors interviewed for this article 
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CHART SHOWING EC-121 CRASH SITE SOUTH OF VLADIVOSTOK
Source: Washington Post, 1969.
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include three former members of the crew of Vdokhnovennyi, one of the three 
Soviet vessels that took part in the operation. Felix Gromov, the ship’s executive 
officer, also provided a handwritten response to the authors’ questions. Gromov, 
a lieutenant commander in 1969, later would be promoted to admiral and go on 
to become the commander in chief of the Russian navy (1992–97). Others inter-
viewed include Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Georgy Kondratiyev, the foreman of the 
mine command of Combat Unit–3 (mines/torpedoes), and Yuri Panachev, a se-
nior seaman. Also interviewed was Colonel Wayne Whitten, USMC (Ret.), who as 
a captain passed on to the Secretary of Defense the sad news of the EC-121 deaths.
THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION: THE COLD WAR
According to a declassified top secret UMBRA NSA report titled The National 
Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown, the North Korean MiGs that shot 
FIGURE 2
FELIX GROMOV, SOVIET NAVY, AS PACIFIC FLEET CRUISER COMMANDER, CIRCA 1970s 
(INSET), AND IN 1992
Sources: Yuri Panachev and Sputnik Image Archive, respectively.
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down the EC-121 “represented the military forces of a small, hostile Communist 
nation . . . that itself was a Cold War creation.”14
The forces that collided on 15 April 1969—the United States Navy reconnaissance 
plane and the MIG-21s of the North Korean Air Force—were symbols of the Cold 
War that had developed following World War II. The EC-121 was a part of the 
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) conducted [jointly] by the 
United States Navy and Air Force [USAF]. These programs were developed in the 
early 1950s as a way of providing intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Communist 
neighbors.15
The Soviet Union
Richard M. Nixon was a renowned Cold Warrior and the Soviet Union was his 
particular focus. According to an NSA report titled American Cryptology during 
the Cold War, within the NSA’s production organization fully 50 percent of the 
staff worked “the Soviet problem.”16 Whenever anything happened between the 
West and a Communist entity, the ever-present question was what role, if any, 
were the Soviets playing in the matter.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet. The United States conducted aerial reconnaissance 
to learn what it could about the Soviet navy’s submarine and surface forces. 
One focus of such attention was Vladivostok. Known historically as the 
“pearl of Russia on the shores of the Pacific,” Vladivostok hosted the head-
quarters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, one of the four Soviet navy flot (fleets).17 
According to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) published a decade after the EC-121 incident, the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet was a large force made up primarily of submarines, surface 
ships, and aircraft. The submarine force consisted of more than a hundred 
submarines, of which thirty-two were ballistic-missile and seventy-eight were 
cruise-missile or torpedo-attack units.18 The surface fleet, the report said, 
consisted of thirty-five cruisers, destroyers, and Krivak-class missile frig-
ates, in addition to numerous smaller naval craft. Nearly all units in the fleet 
were based in either Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk, the latter home to the nu-
clear submarine fleet at the secret Rybachiy base.19 An example of the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet’s activities: in 1972, it would send several cruise-missile-firing sub-
marines and between five and ten surface combatants and auxiliary ships to re-
spond to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports during the Vietnam War.20
With more relevance to the 1969 EC-121 downing, Vdokhnovennyi, a Project 
56 Soviet navy destroyer, was part of a detachment of ships known as a “sea force.” 
Together with a missile cruiser, an antisubmarine ship, a submarine tender, one 
or two tankers, and a support vessel, Vdokhnovennyi sailed to the Indian Ocean 
for “operational service” (training) on 22 October 1968. Until then the ship had 
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remained at Vladivostok, its home port. When the sea force was directed to the In-
dian Ocean it became the second such detachment of Soviet ships to visit the area. 
According to Vladimir Dukel’sky, the former head of intelligence of the 10th Op-
erative Squadron of the Pacific Fleet (OPESK), this group of ships was formed and 
sent into the Indian Ocean to prevent the Americans from “privatizing” the area.21
Seaman Panachev reported that while aboard Vdokhnovennyi he often “met” 
Americans in the Indian Ocean—“We had neither grudge nor rage against them.” 
The Soviet navy, he said, was “quite powerful and diverse in those days.” Off 
Seychelles, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, Vdokhnovennyi also met Soviet 
ships from both the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, Panachev said. “Our cruis-
ers, destroyers, large anti-submarine ships, and submarines were everywhere and 
continuously watched [U.S.] aircraft carriers,” Panachev said.22
“We served this way, where they were, there we were. It’s not like before now.” 
By that Panachev meant that the situation today is not as it was during the Cold 
War. Back then, the Soviet navy opposed—and cursed—the American imperialists 
everywhere at sea, whereas today the sole superpower, America, does whatever it 
wants throughout the world. “I liked serving in the Navy,” Panachev said. “I was 
on a combat ship, constantly in motion; we seldom stood near the moorage wall.”23 
Following a period of training, but before Vdokhnovennyi arrived back at 
Vladivostok, its боевая служба (combat service) included several foreign port 
calls, including to Mombasa, Kenya; Aden, South Yemen; Al Hudaydah, North 
Yemen; Bandar ‘Abbas, Iran; and Umm Qasr, Iraq (and by land to Basra). For 
example, Vdokhnovennyi was docked in North Yemen in early January 1969; the 
EC-121 was shot down about three months later. Had Vdokhnovennyi sailed di-
rectly from there to the Sea of Japan at the ship’s top speed of thirty-eight knots, 
it would have taken a week or more.24
According to Alexandr Rozin, a Russian expert and writer on topics that in-
clude the Soviet fleet, Vdokhnovennyi, and the EC-121 incident, this detachment 
of ships was due to return to Vladivostok in mid-March 1969. Later, however, the 
order was changed to apply only to Vdokhnovennyi, with the other vessels ordered 
to remain in the region; no reason was given for this decision.25 So, on 15 March 
1969, Vdokhnovennyi began moving toward Vladivostok, while the other ships 
of the detachment continued to visit various foreign ports. After sailing a total 
of 25,600 nautical miles, Vdokhnovennyi arrived back at Vladivostok on 4 April 
1969—about ten days before the EC-121 incident.26
The Soviet Union versus Aerial Reconnaissance. Over the decades that the United 
States conducted its aerial reconnaissance to learn about Soviet naval forces and 
their activities, it was commonplace for Soviet fighters to react to these peripheral 
reconnaissance missions, particularly in the vicinity of Vladivostok. The Russians 
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often would send out fighters, in relays, that would pace the aircraft, staying be-
tween them and the Soviet coastline—usually without incident.27 But in thirteen 
cases between 8 April 1950 and 10 March 1964, Soviet retaliation turned deadly 
when the Soviet fighters shot down U.S. reconnaissance planes. On 6 November 
1951, for example, the U.S. Navy became the victim of Soviet aggression when a 
Lockheed P2V Neptune, with a crew of ten, was shot down over the Sea of Japan 
“somewhere off Vladivostok.”28
Given the Soviets’ long history of using deadly force in retaliation against 
what they saw as intrusion into their airspace, might others—the North Kore-
ans—have taken their cue, but not necessarily instructions, from the Soviets in 
the downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane?
Within this context of Cold War hostility and uncertainty, the joint Soviet-
American SAR operation conducted after the downing of the EC-121 constitutes 
a stark contrast. When the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) ordered the 
destroyer USS Henry W. Tucker (DD 875) to rendezvous with Vdokhnovennyi, 
this was the first cooperative meeting of Soviet and American warships since the 
Cold War began at the close of World War II. Later, during a press conference 
ashore in which the captain and executive officer of Tucker answered questions 
from representatives of the world’s media—including ABC, CBS, NBC, and U.S. 
FIGURE 3
VDOKHNOVENNYI IN NORTH YEMEN
Source: Yuri Panachev.
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wire services, as well as Life magazine and Pacific Stars & Stripes—the following 
“facts” came to light: Tucker was the first American ship under way to search for 
the EC-121, the first American ship to arrive on scene, the first to collect de-
bris, the only ship to recover bodies, the only ship chosen to deliver bodies and 
consolidated aircraft debris to Sasebo, Japan—and the only ship to rendezvous 
peacefully with a Soviet destroyer in over twenty-five years.29
North Korea
The Context: The Pueblo Incident. The EC-121 incident, which began in April 
1969, came on the heels of the release of the crew of USS Pueblo. The Pueblo crisis, 
centered on the North Korean seizure of a USN reconnaissance vessel, had begun 
on 23 January 1968. Not since the British boarded USS Chesapeake off the coast 
of Virginia in 1807 had an American naval commander surrendered his ship in 
peacetime, but with Pueblo it happened again. USS Pueblo (AGER 2) was a lightly 
armed, 177-foot, Banner-class technical research ship with a crew of eighty-three 
officers and men. The North Koreans seized it in international waters.
About a week after the seizure of Pueblo, Semyon Kozyrev, the deputy minister 
of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, met Robert Ford, the Canadian ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, at Kozyrev’s office in Moscow; two of Kozyrev’s subordinates 
also were present.30 As recorded in a memorandum intended for distribution to 
Politburo members and candidates, Ford began by referring to their recent con-
versation concerning the North Korean seizure of Pueblo. According to Ford, the 
Soviet position vis-à-vis the Pueblo incident (if he understood it correctly) boiled 
down to four points: (1) the United States should not yield to emotion but instead 
should examine the issues associated with this incident in a calm, businesslike at-
mosphere; (2) the United States should abandon the threat to use force to settle the 
incident; (3) there should be direct talks about this issue between the Americans 
and North Koreans; and (4) it was necessary to eliminate the fever of propaganda 
and the campaign and uproar around discussion of the matter at the UN Security 
Council.31 Thus, representatives of the Soviet Union undertook to instruct the 
United States with regard to its interactions with North Korea.
After nearly a year of brutal internment, North Korea released the crew of 
Pueblo and the body of Petty Officer Duane Hodges, who as a twenty-one-year-
old fireman had died when North Korean gunboats opened fire on the ship. 
The release followed a U.S. apology—an apology the U.S. government quickly 
disavowed. In Washington, Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk issued the following 
statement regarding Pueblo: “The men were released after long and difficult nego-
tiations. The North Korean negotiator insisted from the beginning that the men 
would not be released unless the United States falsely confessed to espionage and 
to violations of North Korean territory and apologized for such alleged actions.”32
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During his 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Nixon described North 
Korea as a “fourth-rate power” and swore there never would be another “Pueblo 
incident.” Five months after his election, however, President Nixon faced his own 
North Korean crisis when the MiG-21s downed the EC-121 in the Sea of Japan. 
The shootdown of this Navy plane by one air-to-air missile (or perhaps two) took 
the lives of thirty-one Americans—thirty sailors and one Marine.33
North Korea versus Aerial Reconnaissance. Well before the April 1969 EC-121 in-
cident began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) JRC in the Pentagon had decided that 
Asian Communist nations fell into a different category from those elsewhere—
including the Soviet Union, despite its history of shooting down U.S. aircraft. As 
Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, an NSA historian, put it, “When one of them launched a 
fighter in reaction, which was rare, they meant business.”34
By the middle of 1963, the JCS had implemented an elaborate White Wolf 
Advisory Warning Program to protect American aircraft flying reconnaissance 
missions, essentially worldwide. Then, in the mid-1960s, in response to what the 
JRC perceived as an elevated security threat, new conditions were inserted into 
the plan. Of these, Condition 3, which required a heightened state of alert aboard 
the aircraft and diversion to a fallback orbit farther off the coast, would be initi-
ated any time a hostile fighter was seen headed over water within one hundred 
nautical miles of the mission. Should a fighter come within fifty nautical miles, 
Condition 5 was initiated, which required an automatic abort.35
Following the institution of these new conditions the United States lost no mis-
sions to the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, or North Vietnam—until 
the April 1969 downing. At the time of the incident, USN and USAF signal intel-
ligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance missions were frequent occurrences off the North 
Korean coast; for example, from January 1969 through the April incident, nearly 
two hundred similar missions—averaging about two a day—were flown. EC-121 
missions were so commonplace, in fact, that they were categorized as “low risk.”36
However, not long before this particular EC-121 mission began, General 
Charles H. Bonesteel III, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, had warned 
of unusually vehement language and surly protests by the North Koreans at 
Panmunjom.37 The warning was passed on to the relevant squadron, which was 
advised to be extracautious. But the North Koreans appeared to suffer perpetually 
through profound mood swings at Armistice Commission meetings, so neither 
the Seventh Fleet nor CINCPAC changed the risk category from “hostile action 
unlikely.”38 Besides, it was thought that Conditions 3 and 5 would cover any po-
tential problems that might arise. Plus, there had been relatively few incidents 
since the White Wolf warning program was instituted in the early 1960s. How-
ever, according to a senior NSA official who was involved with White Wolf, the 
Navy had been an “unenthusiastic” player in the program.39
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The EC-121 was one of the most frequently used reconnaissance platforms 
in this area. While the aircraft’s original configuration was designed to haul pas-
sengers, the EC-121 variant incorporated nearly six tons of sophisticated ELINT 
equipment in addition to its radome.40 The EC-121 was larger than its sister col-
lector, the USN EA-3B Skywarrior jet aircraft, and normally carried two crews 
that worked in relays, enabling it to remain on station for approximately eight 
hours. So while the large, slow, lumbering aircraft had become the easiest target in 
the Navy’s aviation inventory, it remained the aircraft of choice for fleet support.41
Previous to the incident, both J. Strom Thurmond (R-SC), the ranking mem-
ber of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Robert Hotz, former editor of 
Aviation Week, had referred to the EC-121 as a “flying Pueblo”—vulnerable to 
hostile action. In the aftermath of the April 1969 loss, Hotz criticized that, once 
again, the only excuse the U.S. Navy could offer was that “it had never happened 
before,” and he described that response as “a tragic repeat of their pitiful wheeze 
after the Pueblo capture.”42
In any case, everything changed that day in April, when, for the second time in 
fifteen months, a small, isolated North Korea attacked the U.S. military, this time 
by shooting down an EC-121 aircraft.43
The Soviet Union and North Korea
At the authors’ request, a top secret portion of an NSA report on cryptology dur-
ing the Cold War was declassified recently, revealing new details on the EC-121’s 
flight path and the failure to issue an advisory warning. This new information 
shows, for example, that the EC-121 was illuminated by both Soviet and North 
Korean radars, but the North Korean detections were sporadic and, when com-
pared with Soviet tracking, inaccurate. Since Soviet radar was reflecting (track-
ing) the EC-121 prior to the disaster, the Russians must have seen the plane 
disappear from their radar screens.44
At the time of the incident, the USAF base at Osan, South Korea, was “flight-
following” the EC-121.45 The tracking of this USN spy plane, which the NSA 
report says began at 10:00 AM Korean local time, was “initially based on Soviet 
reflections.”46 Also according to this newly declassified information, the closest 
the EC-121 came to either North Korea or the Soviet Union was at 12:04 PM, 
when the So’ndo’k tracking facility showed it to be thirty-eight nautical miles off 
the North Korean coast. However, since the Soviet facilities showed it to be be-
tween eighty-five and one hundred nautical miles off the coast, Osan, the station 
that had primary advisory warning responsibility, declined to issue a Condition 
4, which would have been required had the EC-121 come within eighty nautical 
miles of the Soviet coast. Also newly released is the NSA version of the track of 
the EC-121, which clearly shows the plane over international waters when it was 
shot down.47
10
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Why did the NSA believe that North Korean radar was inferior to what the 
Soviets were using? According to William Hickey, a USN cryptologic veteran, 
although the North Koreans probably obtained most of their radar systems from 
the Chinese or the Russians, they would have represented an older technology 
than the Soviets were using at that time. “You don’t want to sell your best stuff to 
anyone, even your allies,” Hickey said. The North Korean radar was inferior to 
that of the Soviets in a number of factors, including its age and power stability, 
which would impact frequency stability, timing errors, and more. As a result, the 
North Korean signal might have been “jittery,” whereas the Soviet systems were 
known to be more reliable and accurate.48 Thus, while the North Koreans may 
have been operating on poor information, the Soviets knew better.
THE FLIGHT AND THE DOWNING
The EC-121M was from the fleet air reconnaissance squadron designated VQ-1. 
It was commanded by Lieutenant Commander James H. Overstreet, USN, and 
carried thirty-one men, comprising the two full working crews and some excess 
members in training status.49 According to Air Reservist, the flight (call sign Deep 
















FLIGHT PATH OF EC-121
Source: NSA.
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Tokyo, on 15 April 1969 at 6:50 AM (local time), on what should have been a rou-
tine BEGGAR SHADOW reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan.50 
New details of the EC-121 incident came to light only after the declassification 
in 2013 of an undated Naval Scientific and Tech Group, Far East (NSTFE) intelli-
gence report; meanwhile, other details, including the official track of the ill-fated 
spy plane, remained classified until more recently.51 However, it is established that 
at roughly 1:47 PM (local time) the plane was shot down by a pair of North Korean 
MiG-21 fighters off the North Korean coast. After the later recovery of the wreck-
age from the Sea of Japan, a joint USN-USAF investigative team would conclude 
that the EC-121 had sustained major structural damage from the detonation of a 
fragmenting warhead from one air-to-air missile, or possibly two.52
The pilot credited with the kill was Kim Gin-ok, recognized in North Korea as 
the nation’s top fighter ace; during the Korean War, Kim is said to have personally 
downed eleven American aircraft, including three B-29 Superfortress bombers.53 
North Korean defense minister General Choi Hyun hailed the downing of the 
EC-121 as a “heroic feat.”54
The first information concerning the possible plight of the EC-121 was ob-
tained by the duty officer of VQ-1 when that command intercepted and copied a 
friendly warning—its origin unidentified in the record—that hostile aircraft were 
approaching the EC-121. The commanding officer of VQ-1 contacted Fuchu Air 
Station, Japan, for any communications from the mission aircraft and requested 
that personnel at the base check all sources for any message that may have caused 
the EC-121 to abort its mission. VQ-1 made numerous calls for more than half 
an hour, with negative results.55
When VQ-1 lost all effective operational control over the EC-121, it appeared 
that Army, Air Force, and Navy units monitoring the flight must have assumed 
operational control of the aircraft—and if they did not, no one did. Thus, when 
these classified military units subsequently directed warning messages to the 
EC-121 aircraft, VQ-1 was never included as an addressee on any of those mes-
sages.56 So just before 1:00 AM (eastern standard time)—about an hour after 
the apparent downing of the EC-121—the commanding officer of VQ-1 sent a 
Flash message to all appropriate units in the area requesting information on the 
mission aircraft. Shortly thereafter, VQ-1 received a copy of a Critic message 
sent by the USAF Security Service that indicated the possible shootdown of the 
EC-121 over the Sea of Japan.57 The USN plane was listed as missing at 2:00 PM 
that afternoon.58
At NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, the EC-121 downing caused 
a crisis situation. On the day of the shootdown, the NSA declared a SIGINT 
alert code-named BRAVO HANGAR, which it maintained for the remainder of the 
month.59
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Within seventeen minutes after receiving an alert, the 314th Air Division at 
Osan Air Base, South Korea, scrambled fighters. Yet no air unit initiated a SAR 
operation for over an hour after the shootdown.60 And when the first U.S. aircraft 
finally reached the scene, Soviet ships already were in the area. But instead of 
acting aggressively toward the arriving U.S. aircraft, these Soviet ships invited 
cooperation with their long-standing Cold War adversaries.
THE U.S.-SOVIET SAR OPERATION
Surface units of the U.S. Navy responded immediately to the downing of the 
American aircraft; the commander in chief of the Seventh Fleet ordered USS 
Tucker and USS Dale (DLG 19) to get under way as soon as possible and proceed 
to the Sea of Japan to search for the downed plane. However, both ships—which 
happened to be nested together in berth 6 at Sasebo, Japan—were delayed in 
getting under way. Tucker, which needed three hours to light off boilers and 
make sufficient steam to get under way, executed an emergency recall of its crew. 
Dale, with major equipment out for repair at the ship-repair facility at Sasebo, 
estimated it would need ten to twelve hours to get underway; however, it beat its 
projection, managing to get under way only an hour behind Tucker.61
In contrast, at the time of the incident a Soviet Ugra-class Project 1886 subma-
rine tender (hull number 945) and two Foxtrot-class submarines already were at 
sea and in the immediate area of the crash. Next, three large Soviet vessels moved 
in: Vdokhnovennyi (Inspiration), a Kotlin-class destroyer, hull number 429; Stere-
gushchiy (Vigilant), a large antisubmarine ship, No. 580; and later Dalnevostoch-
nyi Komsomolets (Far East Komsomol), No. 427.62 Seas in the area were described 
as moderate, running about four feet. The air temperature was estimated at 42 
to 48 degrees Fahrenheit (5–9 degrees Celsius), with the sea slightly warmer.63
Once the three large Soviet surface vessels were in the vicinity, Washington 
appealed to the Soviet government for them to help locate any survivors. When 
U.S. ambassador Jacob D. Beam in Moscow asked Georgy M. Korniyenko, head 
of the U.S. section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for assistance, Korniyenko said 
he had no knowledge of the incident or the missing aircraft but would inform his 
government of the American request.64
In Washington, Secretary of State William P. Rogers called Soviet ambassador 
Anatoly F. Dobrynin into his office shortly after noon (local time) to discuss the 
shootdown. Rogers stated that the American plane had not violated North Ko-
rean airspace and that the United States was unsure, at that point, whether there 
were any survivors. Rogers then repeated the U.S. request, expressed earlier in 
Moscow, that the Soviet ships in the shootdown area assist in the search and res-
cue.65 At the time he was unaware that Soviet ships already had begun retrieving 
EC-121 debris from the sea.
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In line with the U.S. desire for Soviet aid, the JCS directed U.S. forces operating 
in the Sea of Japan not to interfere with rescue attempts by other ships, regardless 
of nationality. In addition, the Fifth Air Force was ordered not to interfere with 
any Soviet aircraft in the vicinity of the shootdown.66
Meanwhile, back at the crash scene, American aircraft established radio con-
tact with Steregushchiy. The ship revealed that it already had picked up pieces of 
the plane, but there was no sign of survivors. Steregushchiy personnel granted 
permission for an American plane to fly low over their ship to photograph the 
debris. U.S. aircraft located some additional debris and dropped a smoke signal 
to mark the spot, then guided one of the Soviet destroyers to the marker, where it 
put small boats in the water to recover some of the debris. Sadly, while these boats 
took aboard the only two bodies ever to be recovered, they found no survivors.67
To establish communications, a USAF survival radio—a URC-10—was 
dropped to the Soviet ships. In addition to the radio, a U.S. Army sergeant who 
was a Russian linguist was put aboard one of the aircraft dispatched to the search 
area.68
According to a later Pentagon statement, the air and sea search for survivors 
began in an area centered about seventy-five miles off North Korea in the Sea 
of Japan. A Navy search plane sighted debris that it said “could be associated 
with the missing aircraft” about 120 miles southeast of Ch’ŏngjin, North Korea; 
however, the crew of the search plane did not report any evidence of survivors. 
The Department of Defense report stated that a Navy “patrol plane” had guided 
two Soviet destroyers that already were on scene in the area where the debris was 
spotted. At the time, there was no report of the ships’ findings.69
In addition to the U.S. Air Force and Navy, the USAF Reserve figured promi-
nently in these SAR activities. The members of the 305th Aerospace Rescue 
and Recovery Service (ARRS) were reservists from Selfridge Air Force Base, 
Michigan; the unit had been mobilized during the 1968 Pueblo incident. In June 
1969, in a well-deserved expression of self-praise on behalf of the reserves, Air 
Reservist magazine would mention how the 305th had played a “key role” in the 
EC-121 matter, which it said had added “at least one instance of heroism to their 
record.” Flying Boeing HC-97 rescue aircraft, two aircrews of the 305th took off 
from Naha, Okinawa, in the early morning hours of 16 April. They flew to the 
area of the air-sea search, approximately eighty-three miles southeast of Ch’ŏngjin 
and seventy-two miles due east of the North Korean coast, where they relieved 
a C-130 Hercules (a medium-range transport plane) of the 36th ARRS, based in 
Tachikawa, Japan, about twenty miles west of Tokyo.70
On the morning of 17 April, two days after the shootdown, the waters of the 
Sea of Japan yielded the bodies of only two crewmen, that of Lieutenant (junior 
grade) Joseph R. Ribar and Aviation Electronics Technician First Class Richard E. 
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Sweeney. Their bodies were recovered seventeen nautical miles north of the gen-
eral incident area. Throughout the day, winds and currents continued to cause 
the debris to drift toward the North Korean and Soviet coasts. The Soviets again 
were requested to pick up any bodies or debris within twenty nautical miles of 
the coastlines—areas that were off-limits to American craft. Search operations by 
the two U.S. destroyers, a C-130, a P-3, and four F-106s from the Fifth Air Force 
continued throughout the day.71
At 10:02 PM (local) on 19 April, at the end of a fourth day of searching, the JCS 
terminated SAR operations, with twenty-nine of the thirty-one crewmen unac-
counted for.72 Combat air patrols continued over the USN surface units until the 
following day, when the ships passed south of the thirty-eighth parallel.73
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS
American Accounts
For the men of the 36th ARRS, a period of frantic activity began with the ring-
ing of the scramble alarm. According to an Associated Press (AP) report out of 
Tachikawa, the plane was reported missing at 2:00 PM. “At 3:25 the horn blew 
and at 3:41 we were airborne,” said the thirty-four-year-old pilot, Air Force major 
George W. Hillyer. First Lieutenant Roy B. Petit, who majored in Russian studies, 
the copilot of the first C-130 to take off, said he grabbed his oxygen mask and 
raced to his aircraft with other crewmembers. Moments later, Major Hillyer ar-
rived from a briefing in the control center.74
The crew of the C-130 knew only that an EC-121 was missing in the Sea of 
Japan. They were told that it had gone down approximately ninety nautical miles 
southeast of the North Korean port of Ch’ŏngjin; however, Major Hillyer later 
reported that when he spotted the wreckage it was perhaps another forty-five 
nautical miles east of that position. When Hillyer’s plane reached the EC-121’s 
last known position, the sun was about to set. There was no sign of survivors or 
aircraft debris.
At one point, however, Major Hillyer and Lieutenant Petit both thought they 
saw two or three dim, steady lights floating on the waves. At 12:30 the next morn-
ing, with their plane running low on fuel, they were about to head to Osan for rest 
and refueling when they again saw lights on the water and realized they were the 
searchlights of a ship. Hillyer had the feeling it was a Soviet ship but had no idea 
what it was doing or whether it considered his presence unfriendly. However, 
“They were very friendly,” Captain Thomas van Winkle, the pilot of a second 
C-130, said in an interview. “I was preoccupied with finding survivors. It never 
occurred to me that these people would be anything but friendly. They were ob-
viously trying to help us in this catastrophe.” Major Hillyer and Lieutenant Petit, 
also present in the interview, nodded in agreement with van Winkle’s words.
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The next day, Captain van Winkle positively identified and got in touch with 
the two Soviet destroyers in the search area. From the air, van Winkle saw orange 
and white debris scattered over a wide area, so he dropped smoke flares to guide 
the searching Soviet destroyers. He also dropped a survival radio to one of the 
Soviet ships, but they could not communicate satisfactorily with it. After drop-
ping the radio, van Winkle recalled that Lieutenant Petit, then still resting at Osan, 
spoke Russian, so he urged that a C-130 return with Petit aboard. 
When the press later interviewed Petit, he said he had been concentrating so 
heavily over the previous several months on learning to speak Japanese that at 
first only Japanese words came to mind when he was again on scene. From his 
C-130, Petit called down to the Soviet destroyer, in Russian: “Ship No. 580 [the 
large antisubmarine ship Steregushchiy]. This is No. 963. Do you understand?” He 
repeated that same message five or six times. Eventually an answer came in flat, 
expressionless Russian: “Greetings, I understand you.”
Then, in a voice expressing urgency, Petit asked, “Have you seen any survi-
vors? Have you seen any people?” This was followed by a disappointing response: 
“No, we have not seen any. Have you?” When Petit responded in the negative, 
the conversation turned to aircraft debris, which was seen floating all about the 
ship. When the Americans asked the Soviet destroyer whether it had taken any 
aircraft parts aboard, a Russian voice answered yes. When Petit asked the Rus-
sians whether they would mind if his plane dropped down to have a better look at 
the debris on deck, the Russian voice said it would be okay. “We will come down 
low over the ship. Please don’t fear,” Petit said. The reply came back: “That’s fine.” 
What the American pilot described as a “cordial” conversation followed. When 
Major Hillyer brought the plane down to three hundred feet and made two or 
three passes near the ship, the Americans sighted a wheel, a ladder, and other 
aircraft parts on the deck of the Soviet ship. He then flew on to the other Soviet 
ship, the destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, and after a similar conversation dropped a 
radio to that ship as well.
When an American pilot asked Vdokhnovennyi what parts of the EC-121 it had 
aboard, the ship answered with the following list: a rubber life raft (no size given), 
cigarette packs, imperial pencils, an aircraft seat, parts of wood, a man’s coat (no 
name), and parts of the aircraft. All answers from Vdokhnovennyi were given in 
Russian. “Looking up names of these articles in Russian dictionary (our aircraft 
doing this)—will pass [on] this information later,” the American pilot said. Mys-
teriously, when the American asked whether the ships in the crash area the night 
before had been theirs, the Russians broke off communications. “Up until that 
point, communications were clear; it was a definite break off.” (This note came 
from the “scratch” desk log of VQ-1, which recorded events as they unfolded.)75 
When the Soviet destroyer provided the list of items that had been picked out of 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/9
 1 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the water, the Americans were unaware that Vdokhnovennyi either soon would 
transfer a load of EC-121 debris to Vladivostok or had just done so.
When the 305th arrived, the HC-97 crew, commanded by Major Michael J. 
McLeod, took over as on-scene controllers, while another aircraft, flown by Cap-
tain Robert J. McClear, with Major Howard D. Coffman as backup pilot, began to 
fly a search pattern. At sundown, the searchers were joined by the U.S. destroyer 
Tucker. Both aircrews reported spotting pieces of debris. They remained in the 
vicinity throughout the night, controlling the efforts of other search aircraft and 
vessels while dropping flares to illuminate the area. After being out on the mis-
sion for more than fifteen hours, both aircrews were relieved by other rescue 
crews.76 The Fifth Air Force Joint Rescue Coordination Center stated that a total 
of twenty-six aircraft would be operating in the search area by daylight.77
On 19 April, at Tachikawa, Japan, Second Lieutenant Ronald Adinolfi of the 
36th ARRS told reporters he had flown a mission in which his C-130 photo-
graphed the transfer of EC-121 debris from Soviet to American warships. As 
Adinolfi explained, after Vdokhnovennyi gave Lieutenant Petit a list of the items 
it had picked up, Captain van Winkle and his crew received words of condolence 
from the Russians.78 Takashi Oka, the New York Times Tokyo bureau chief, and 
the AP added further details.
As the Americans’ C-130 circled overhead its pilot received a message in heavi-
ly accented but distinct English that said: “Soviet Destroyer 429 [Vdokhnovennyi], 
Red Banner Pacific Fleet, sends condolences in connection with the loss of your 
aircraft.” No explanation was given for the phrase “Red Banner.”79 The message 
was repeated several times as the Soviet destroyer steamed in the Sea of Japan, 
150 miles from its home port of Vladivostok, toward its rendezvous with Tucker.80
According to Adinolfi, at the time of the SAR operation, there initially were 
some nervous reactions, apparently because the Russians thought the USN men 
planned on coming aboard their ship. Eventually, however, the Americans got the 
Russians to understand that the transfer of EC-121 debris, from Vdokhnovennyi 
to Tucker, could be accomplished using only the ships’ small boats.
At 4:00 PM on 18 April, at the end of three days of search, Vdokhnovennyi 
transferred the debris its crew had accumulated to Tucker, which already had 
taken aboard the bodies of the two EC-121 crewmen. Included in the transfer was 
a twenty-man lifeboat, three leather jackets, a parachute, two exposure suits, and 
various aircraft parts. Adinolfi noted that the Russians even returned the small 
radios dropped to them that had enabled communications between Soviet ships 
and U.S. aircraft. The transfer via whaleboats required only eight minutes or so. 
Then the Soviet ship turned northward and disappeared over the horizon. When 
Vdokhnovennyi reappeared, it again rendezvoused with its American counter-
part, Tucker.
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When the SAR operation ended, Tucker proceeded to Sasebo, Japan, with the 
bodies of the two EC-121 crewmen, plus over five hundred pounds of debris. A 
gunner’s mate on Tucker still remembers the details of his ship’s participation in 
the operation. On the afternoon of the shootdown his ship had just pulled into 
Sasebo for liberty, but after crewmen had been on the beach for less than an hour 
the shore patrol ordered them back to the ship. “We got steam up and went all 
ahead flank for the crash site. Surface searches all the next day, the coldest watch 
I’ve ever stood. Recovered a lot of pieces of the plane, full of bullet holes. I helped 
bring the bodies aboard and carry them below, and I was in the dress honor guard 
as we brought the caskets ashore back in Sasebo.” Then he said that they “went 
back to swapping rounds with the shore batteries in Haiphong Harbor. It was just 
more of the war to us.”81
Soviet Accounts
Interesting and largely overlooked in the EC-121 incident are the details of this 
joint U.S.-Soviet SAR operation from the point of view of the Soviet sailors and 
officers who took part. The following is a rare look into this four-day-long co-
operative effort between traditional Cold War adversaries, including firsthand 
accounts by three former crewmen of the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovennyi.
In August 1992, Admiral Felix Gromov would be made commander in chief of 
the Russian navy.82 But in 1969, as a lieutenant commander, Gromov was serving 
as executive officer of Vdokhnovennyi, and years later he provided handwritten 
answers (in Russian) to the authors’ questions on the events in question. Yuri 
Panachev, who served in the underwater weapons branch of the ship during 
Gromov’s tenure, recalls him fondly. “[I’ll] always remember the [ship’s] Execu-
tive Officer with great warmth . . . good man.”83
As Admiral Gromov explained (in his letter to one of the authors), the Soviet 
Pacific fleet command held Vdokhnovennyi’s operational service in high regard. 
The ship’s main task was surveillance over the “potential enemy,” a “show of flag,” 
and “friendship visits” to the ports of friendly countries. “Of course, we [also] 
closely monitored the world atmosphere in connection with the Pueblo situation,” 
Gromov wrote. After Vdokhnovennyi completed its mission pursuant to the down-
ing of the EC-121, the crew received a short rest before returning to home port.84
Panachev, a senior seaman, and Gromov, the ship’s executive officer, recall 
certain details of the incident differently. For example, was Vdokhnovennyi at 
sea when the EC-121 was shot down? Panachev and Kondratiyev said yes. Did 
Vdokhnovennyi’s crew recover classified materials from the wreckage of the EC-
121 but fail to return them to the Americans? Panachev was unsure; Gromov said 
yes. The following are Admiral Gromov’s closing remarks.
We were put on combat alert and, as the most combat-capable ship, ordered to be 
the first sent to the place of downing. The search task and approximate coordinates 
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were only assigned at sea. Arriving in the region, we started the search and found 
documents, body remains, and details of the plane’s internal parts. We brought 
aboard everything we could during daylight hours. Various documents were there. 
As night approached, we rapidly got to Vladivostok, turned the documents over at 
staff headquarters, and just as rapidly returned to the search zone. Yes, during [our 
prior] service, our ships confronted the Americans all the time—even collisions took 
place—but we, believing that relations had to be equal, couldn’t afford to have the 
Americans dominate. And the Soviet Navy succeeded in doing so. [Owing to the mis-
sion’s classified nature,] [l]ikely, it is all that I can say on your questions.85
In 2008, two sailors from the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, CPO Georgy 
Kondratiyev and Yuri Panachev, described their roles in the U.S.-Soviet coopera-
tive salvage effort.86 Their comments came in response to a request from a naval 
club in Saint Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city, which had received a letter 
from American navy veterans who were attempting to locate Russian sailors who 
had taken part in the search for EC-121 debris.
At the time of the EC-121 incident, Kondratiyev said, his ship was conducting 
combat training missions in the Sea of Japan. Then suddenly it was announced 
that Vdokhnovennyi was going to begin searching for a crashed American plane. 
As he recalled, the ship arrived in the search area during the morning hours. 
Since American ships were “absent nearby,” an agreement was reached between 
the Soviet and U.S. commands for the Soviet ships to assist in the search for plane 
debris while American planes—a Neptune (a Lockheed P-2) and an Orion (a 
Lockheed P-3)—flew over the area believed to be the crash site. According to a 
USN spokesman, it was a USN P-3 patrol plane that guided the Soviet destroyers 
to the area of the debris.87
Kondratiyev said that before the search began the Americans had dropped 
portable transmitters into the water for coordinating the search from the air. 
Meanwhile, Vdokhnovennyi put a motorboat and a rowboat in the water. Kon-
dratiyev, a rower on the ship’s rowboat crew, said he “participated personally in 
the search and gathering [of] plane remains.” Nearby, Steregushchiy also searched; 
Kondratiyev said he could not recall the name of the other ship since it was a mis-
sile antisubmarine ship and their naval units were stationed at different piers in 
the Vladivostok region.88
Kondratiyev then described the range of debris retrieved from the sea. “We 
picked up all floating debris [and placed it into our motorboat]: logbooks, 
clothes, an inflatable raft, lifejackets, spare radio parts wrapped in polyethylene, 
plastic bags with some [unknown] powder, [and] pieces of hull.” As Kondratiyev 
recalls, “Americans showed [us] the area where most of the debris gathered. Our 
command informed the Americans on search results. The search continued all 
day long.”89
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As Kondratiyev recalls, Tucker was to rendezvous with his ship to receive 
the debris. That evening, however, when Tucker arrived, an order was issued to 
return to Vladivostok, urgently. “The Americans followed us up to our territo-
rial waters,” Kondratiyev said, “not understanding our ‘getaway’ as we, ourselves, 
did not.” Only in Vladivostok, he said, was the crew told that North Korea had 
downed a reconnaissance aircraft with thirty-one men aboard. All the debris was 
taken out for examination at night; what they decided to hand over to the Ameri-
cans (to determine the cause of the “accident”) was delivered the next morning. 
Kondratiyev’s words, however, contradict what Panachev and Gromov have said; 
namely, that the crew was told about the incident before heading to the search 
area. Some fifty years after the event, Kondratiyev may have been confused about 
some details.90
Later that same day, Kondratiyev’s ship, the destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, returned 
to the search area, where the items of debris were to be passed to the Americans. 
“At the rendezvous point,” Kondratiyev said, “our ships stood board-and-board 
by right sides, [and the Soviet crewmen were] piped over the side, as motorboats 
were set into the water.” Kondratiyev said there were four or five sailors, plus an 
officer interpreter, in each whaleboat. The recovered items then were transferred 
to the American motorboat.91
Senior seaman Yuri Panachev, from Yuzhnoukrainsk, Ukraine, who also 
served in the crew of Vdokhnovennyi, later provided his firsthand recollections. 
After he left the service, Panachev said he studied medicine and became a phy-
sician. His medical training allowed him to identify later the body parts pulled 
from the water; at the time of the incident, however, Panachev said he only knew 
that they were human remains.92
Panachev said his battle station was located at the stern of the ship. Among 
his duties as a senior electrician, Panachev maintained the rocket-assisted bomb 
launcher’s electrical system. Regarding the North Korean downing of the EC-121, 
Panachev also recalled “picking up debris of an American plane.” He said that 
each iteration always began the same way: “With the shrill ring of the alarm bells, 
‘Stand by, General Quarters!!!’”93
At the time of the incident, Panachev said his ship had been at sea for a few 
weeks—“All was as usual: a watch, rest, maintenance work, cleaning. . . . It was 
boring, but necessary. The sea was growing stormy a bit, but no one worried too 
much about this fact; a long ocean voyage was behind us, stretching . . . from 
Vladivostok to Africa!”94
After supper, Panachev began standing watch at his battle station in the four-
teenth compartment, near the aft rocket launcher. After examining the equip-
ment, Panachev sat in his chair, put the earphone helmet on, and had just begun 
reporting readiness to the main control room when “the so-loved alarm gongs 
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rang.” Surely, it was a call to military service, he thought. “I assumed that a mili-
tary training exercise was starting, [so] I prepared to receive commands, but the 
earphone helmet kept silent. The ship stopped and then dashed forward.”95
After four hours the watch changed and Panachev went to bed. The next 
morning, he woke up to silence, not knowing where the destroyer had rushed to. 
Panachev recalled American planes dropping something red into the water by 
parachute, which turned out to be a portable transmitter. “It was brought to the 
[main control room] immediately,” he said.96
Panachev said his BCh-3 (Combat Unit–3) was responsible for the lowering 
of the working boat (located on the port side amidships) into the water.97 The 
crewmen then climbed down into the boat by storm ladder. “There were five of 
us and an officer,” he said. But the men were not given instructions until after 
the whaleboat had left the destroyer; at that point, the officer explained the tasks 
the men were to perform, which were to pick up everything floating on the sea 
surface and check attentively whether men were in the water.98
No debris was spotted at first. The men then heard an odd sound that sur-
prised them—a sound that appeared to come from tiny hammers striking the side 
of the boat. At first glance, it appeared the “hammers” were in fact a large mass 
of shattered glass bottles. But once the men began picking up the glass from the 
surface of the water with a skimmer, closer examination revealed that it actually 
consisted of the shattered remnants of radio vacuum tubes off the U.S. spy plane. 
The men placed the glass fragments into buckets.99
Nothing else was seen on the water until they spotted a piece of EC-121 fuse-
lage, which Panachev estimated to be approximately 2 by 1.5 meters in size; but 
he found it not to be too heavy, owing to its honeycomb construction. Later, a lot 
more debris began to pop up, including numerous thick books whose pages were 
filled with figures—presumably classified material. After the men loaded up their 
motorboat with debris they returned to their ship.100
When their boat got under way again, the men were ordered to pick up “jour-
nals”—entire publications—that had floated to the surface. Other items retrieved 
included aircraft covering (notably inner covering), greenish in color, that was 
said to resemble a passenger car seat cover. There was so much of it, Panachev 
said, that it filled half the motorboat. The boatswain, Warrant Officer Kolosov, 
whom Panachev described as a “practical person,” said everything picked up 
would be useful—and he was right; the covering, about 5 mm thick, later was 
used to line stools and cover lockers inside their ship.101
The men also pulled human remains out of the water, undoubtedly those of 
the crew of the EC-121—the inner organs of the abdomen (small bowel, a part of 
the large intestine, and a part of the liver with stomach)—which they placed in 
a small sack. Around lunchtime, a command was issued to hoist the motorboat 
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and rowboat into the ship, alarm bells rang, and Vdokhnovennyi rushed off (to 
Vladivostok, as the men found out later).102
When the ship arrived in port that evening, Panachev said his ship was 
moored stern to at a pier to which they never had been before. At daybreak, 
Combat Unit–3 began off-loading the debris. Before arriving at Vladivostok, 
with the debris already wrapped in polyethylene, the executive officer of Vdokh-
novennyi (Gromov) explained the next part of their mission to the crew over 
the intercom—with words to the effect that “we are going to a rendezvous with 
an American destroyer to pass the found plane fragments, so be vigilant.” Then 
the zampolit, the Communist Party official aboard the ship, added that “the 
enemy was crafty and very capable of provocation, but he didn’t clarify which 
one [i.e., specify the Americans]. Well, yes; we did not know this!” Panachev 
said sarcastically.103
FIGURE 5
USN SMALL BOATS APPROACH THE SOVIET RESCUE AND SALVAGE TEAM, WITH 
TUCKER IN THE BACKGROUND
Source: Yuri Panachev, via The Tin Can Sailor.
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When Vdokhnovennyi reached the rendezvous point, the American destroyer al-
ready was waiting around for them. “We stared at her severely,” Panachev said. “Here 
he is, the visible enemy!” The Soviets then set a motorboat back into the water and 
began loading the collected debris into it. When they got under way, they imagined 
passing the load to the Americans: “So rugged and toothless enemies will sail now.”104
Just then, Panachev said, “a motorboat popped out from behind the American 
destroyer’s aft and headed towards us. We moved slowly.” But instead of “the en-
emy,” he said that a light, swift motorboat with flag flying approached, with some 
“joyful Americans” aboard. “The Americans—young, smiling guys—were telling 
us something and waving. Our brains went numb, really. They were the same as 
us—tense anxiety disappeared immediately. I began taking photos, forgetting 
about the debris. Someone from their side gave the order. Stretching out their 
arms to take the load, we handed them all [over].”105
As CPO Kondratiyev recalls, salvage operations ended with a courteous part-
ing of the ways, when a USN officer thanked the Soviet command for assistance. 
After exchanging a few words, he handed a butane cigarette lighter in its case to 
the Russian interpreter, plus two more lighters to be passed along to the Soviet 
ship’s commanding and executive officers. Kondratiyev said he was presented 
with a bunch of Playboy magazines—which the zampolit confiscated immediately 
after Kondratiyev’s return to the ship. Kondratiyev also emphasized that no un-
toward incidents took place between the U.S. and Soviet motorboats.106
RESPONSES
During the immediate aftermath of the April 1969 downing of the EC-121 and 
what followed, the incident was viewed through the prism of the Cold War. The 
passage of time, however, brought additional information forward. In the years 
since, greater access to additional records and documents, as well as accounts by 
those who experienced the incident firsthand, has clarified some of the events; 
however, some questions remain—as do differing interpretations of those events.
North Korea
Suffice it to say, North Korea made no contribution to the SAR effort its actions 
had made necessary; on the other hand, neither did it interfere. Although no 
North Korean ships were sighted during the joint SAR operation, Soviet sailor 
Yuri Panachev recalls that two North Korean MiGs flew over at low altitude. 
“They dipped their wings [mockingly] and disappeared.” Someone shouted that 
they were Korean aircraft, Panachev said.107 What a shock it must have been for 
those North Korean pilots to witness their supposed friends (the Russians) work-
ing cooperatively with their sworn enemies (the Americans).
Four days after the search came to a halt, word reached Washington of a state-
ment from Pyongyang that suggested North Korea might shoot down additional 
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U.S. reconnaissance planes in the future.108 Would there continue to be such re-
connaissance flights? A 1969 article in Newsweek titled “An Exercise in Restraint” 
claimed that the downing of the EC-121 and crew in the frigid waters of the Sea 
of Japan had “immediately plunged the U.S. into a soul-searching examination of 
the parameters of its global power.”109
According to a Nixon administration source, “a lot of problems [had] to be 
sorted out” before EC-121 flights could be resumed on a regular basis—but 
flights continued nonetheless.110 According to United Press International, about 
a week after the downing, the Japanese press and television outlets reported from 
Tokyo that an EC-121 had taken off from an air base in Japan, and Japanese 
television filmed the plane as it took off from the base at Atsugi. A U.S. military 
spokesman declined to comment.111
North Korea’s official press agency responded by issuing a 2,300-word decla-
ration from Pyongyang. The message, monitored in Tokyo, castigated President 
Nixon for his decision to continue reconnaissance flights—now with fighter 
cover—and for forming a powerful USN task force (TF 71) in the Sea of Japan, 
which clearly was designed to intimidate Kim Il-sung’s regime.112 A segment of 
the message specifically concerning the EC-121 incident read as follows:
Even though the U.S. imperialists insist, in word, that their planes will fly over  
high seas, there is no ground to guarantee that they will not intrude into the territo-
rial air of our country again.
FIGURE 6
UGRA-CLASS SUB TENDER
Source: Smart Maritime Group website.
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. . . If the reconnaissance planes of the U.S. imperialists intrude into the territorial air 
of our country, we will not sit with folded arms, but will take resolute measures for 
safeguarding our sovereignty as ever. 
Then the U.S. imperialists will use this as a pretext to commit a full-scale armed at-
tack against us, which may only lead to another total war in Korea in the end.113
The Press
It was press coverage of the unfolding events that first brought to the world’s at-
tention the role the Soviet Union was playing in the aftermath of the downing. 
The fact that the Soviets indeed were participating in the EC-121 SAR operation 
became public once the Fifth Air Force, headquartered in Japan, released pho-
tographs of Soviet destroyers in the general search area. The photos were taken 
from a 36th ARRS C-130.114
When planes of the USAF Reserve first flew low over the crash scene, they 
photographed Steregushchiy, a large Soviet antisubmarine ship. One of those 
photos then was released to the AP wire service, in what is known as a handout. 
A few days after the attack, a high-resolution photo of Steregushchiy with one of 
its whaleboats nearby, searching for debris and possible survivors, accompanied 
a front-page-headline story in the New York Times. The caption under the photo 
read, “IN THE SEA OF JAPAN: A motor launch moves away from a Soviet de-
stroyer [sic] to pick up debris believed to be from the missing U.S. intelligence 
plane. Soviet ships are taking part in the search at the request of the United 
States.”115
Another photo shows whaleboats of USS Tucker and the Soviet destroyer 
Vdokhnovennyi approaching each other, with a C-130 circling overhead.116 A 
third photo, said to be of poor quality, bore the handwritten caption: “Destroyer 
picking up piece of yellow metal from area.”117 This photo, taken when debris 
had not yet been identified positively, shows a motor launch, apparently from a 
Soviet destroyer, with men leaning over the gunwales and possibly holding the 
yellow metal.118 As the operation was drawing to a close, the New York Times con-
cluded its detailed account of the incident with a front-page story entitled “U.S. 
Fliers Describe Soviet Aid on Plane” that ended with the words “Thus closed an 
extraordinary three days [sic; actually four] of Soviet-American cooperation.”119
However, not all press coverage took the opportunity to highlight the Soviet 
contribution. An article in Pacific Stars & Stripes (under the title “N. Koreans 
Down Navy Recon Plane”) mentioned how Tucker and the frigate USS Dale were 
expected to reach the search area, but it made hardly any mention of the Soviet 
ships that were first to arrive at the crash site, nor did an AP press release that 
appeared within that Pacific Stars & Stripes article make any mention of Soviet 
ships. The only other immediate mention, in fact, appeared in accounts of a press 
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conference held by Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R-IL). At a White House meet-
ing, Dirksen said the EC-121 had possible survivors and that legislative leaders 
were informed that two ships, “believed to be Russian, were moving toward the 
spot where the plane was downed.”120
Some of the later press coverage focused on questions, not answers. A June 
1969 article in Air Reservist magazine wondered why Soviet ships “happen[ed] 
to be in the area” and why they arrived at the crash site before American ships.121 
Part of the answer was simply the proximity of the last known position of the 
missing EC-121 to Vladivostok. In addition, we now know that the two U.S. 
ships involved in the SAR operation were delayed in getting under way, as noted 
previously. Whether there were any other reasons for the quick Soviet response 
remains a matter of speculation.
In 2004, Professor Narushige Michishita, now at the National Graduate In-
stitute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, referenced the North Korean downing of the 
USN EC-121 reconnaissance plane in an article in the Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis. The article makes no mention, however, of the joint U.S.-Soviet SAR 
effort. Instead, Michishita explains how 1966–72 represented the “genesis” of 
North Korean military-diplomatic campaigns. At the time of the incident, North 
Korea employed MiG-21 fighters, which he writes were “newly introduced from 
the Soviet Union.” The April 1969 incident marked the first successful intercep-
tion, after failed attempts had been made in January 1954, February 1955, June 
1959, and April 1965—a clear sign that the “military balance had been gradually 
shifting in favor of North Korea,” Michishita wrote.122
In 2017, Van Jackson, an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Se-
curity Studies, wrote an essay on the EC-121 downing for the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. In accordance with what he describes as North 
Korea’s “coercive theory of victory,” Jackson states that the incident had “special 
meaning in the history of U.S.–North Korea relations.” Although the Soviets had 
exercised “little to no control” over North Korean foreign policy, Jackson avers 
that they had attempted to restrain North Korea on several occasions.123 Again, 
there was no mention of this rare joint SAR effort between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The Nixon Administration
The separate but related questions of what role, if any, the Soviet Union might 
have played in North Korea’s downing of the American plane and the role it might 
play, and in fact already had played, in the resultant SAR case were intertwined 
from the start. On the day of the downing, Secretary of State William P. Rogers 
had a fifteen-minute conversation with Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin 
that was not in any way a protest but rather an appeal for assistance.124 Behind 
the scenes, Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon’s national 
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security advisor, had spoken on the telephone. According to a transcript of their 
conversation, Rogers said he was going to have Dobrynin in at noon. Kissinger 
said the president did not want any protests to anyone. In response, Rogers said 
he was not going to protest, he just wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to 
save the men. In a later telephone conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discussed 
the idea of a formal protest but “decided [it] should not be done with Soviets.”125
A few days after the attack, it was only in accompaniment to a headline story, 
entitled “U.S. to Emphasize Diplomatic Steps on Loss of Plane,” quoting U.S. 
government officials that “[d]iplomatic action rather than military retaliation 
will be the Nixon Administration’s essential response to North Korea’s shooting 
down of a United States reconnaissance plane” that the New York Times printed 
the front-page photo of Steregushchiy and its whaleboat. As noted previously, the 
caption accompanying that photo noted that the Soviet ships were taking part in 
the search at the request of the United States.126
During a press conference on 18 April, President Nixon addressed the down-
ing of the EC-121. “As was pointed out in the protest that was filed at Panmunjom 
yesterday, and also in the Defense Department statement,” the president said, “the 
plane involved was an unarmed Constellation, propeller driven.” Nixon said that 
the plane was conducting reconnaissance, but at no time had it come closer than 
forty miles to the coast of North Korea. “[A]ll of the evidence that we have,” the 
president said, “indicates that it was shot down approximately 90 miles from the 
shores of North Korea while it was moving outward, aborting the mission on orders 
that had been received.” He said they knew this because of U.S. radar; more impor-
tant was the fact that “the North Koreans knew it based on their radar.” Therefore, 
the attack was unprovoked, Nixon stated. “It was deliberate. It was without warn-
ing. The protest has been filed: The North Koreans have not responded.”127
Nixon also said that such missions were not uncommon. “This year [and it 
was only mid-April] we have had already 190 of these flights without incident, 
without threat, without warning, at all.” The president observed that, throughout 
the period of the Nixon administration, in response to an increasing number of 
North Korean incidents and threats of military action against South Korea and 
against the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, “[w]e have had a policy of recon-
naissance flights in the Sea of Japan, similar to this flight.”128
When asked about North Korea’s motives and whether he saw any parallels or 
patterns between the attacks against the EC-121 and USS Pueblo, the president 
said the Pueblo incident was “quite different,” in two respects. As for Pueblo, there 
was some uncertainty for a time regarding the location of Pueblo at the moment 
of the attack. “Present indications are that the Pueblo was in international waters,” 
the president said; in contrast, regarding the EC-121 there was no uncertainty: the 
United States knew what North Korean radar showed. “We incidentally [also] know 
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what the Russian radar showed,” the president said. “And all three radars [including 
America’s] showed exactly the same thing.” Under the circumstances, Nixon called 
it “completely [a] surprise attack.”129 Subsequently, when North Korea asserted that 
the EC-121 had intruded into “the territorial air of our country,” the White House 
contradicted that contention, averring that the USN plane was over international 
waters and well off the coast of North Korea when the two MiG jets attacked it.130
When asked what role, if any, the Soviet Union may have played in the EC-121 
incident, Nixon replied as follows:
The Soviet role in the plane incident first is one of being of assistance to the United 
States in recovering the debris and looking for survivors. And we are most grateful 
to the Soviet Union for helping us in this respect. Our intelligence—and of course no 
one can be sure here—indicates that the Soviet Union was not aware that this attack 
was to be made. North Korea is not a nation that is predictable in terms of its actions. 
It is perhaps more than any other nation in the Communist bloc completely out of 
[the] control of either the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Communist China.131
While the U.S. government was appreciative of Soviet efforts to search for 
possible survivors of the EC-121 and remained uncertain about the degree of 
Soviet influence over North Korean actions, Ambassador Beam left the follow-
ing cautionary note with Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin during a face-to-face 
meeting in Moscow on 22 April 1969. “The shootdown of our aircraft is only the 
most recent example of developments in the area which lead to increased tension 
and which must be a source of concern to the Soviet Government as well as to us. 
We hope the Soviet Union will do what it can to restrain the North Koreans from 
such irresponsible acts since we believe it to be in our mutual interest to avoid 
further exacerbation of tension in the area.”132
Pentagon analysts stated they believed that the Soviets “probably” had warned 
North Korea against a repetition of either the seizure of a ship such as Pueblo or 
the shooting down of an American plane. The Pentagon also believed the Soviets 
had warned the North Koreans that they would not support them with either war 
supplies or forces should a future attack lead to hostilities with the United States.133 
Fortunately, neither type of tragedy involving North Korea has occurred since.
In the short term, the U.S. Navy seems to have been less ambivalent regarding 
Soviet cooperation in the SAR operation than the rest of the government. Three 
months after the EC-121 incident, Fred S. Hoffman, a military writer for the AP in 
Washington, DC, noted a distinct thawing of the Cold War. He stated that Ameri-
can admirals, who had thundered for years about the growing Soviet naval chal-
lenge, were being “unusually restrained about a Russian squadron making a ‘show 
the flag’ voyage to Cuba.”134 This was the first mention of any warming since the 
U.S. and Soviet navies had conducted their joint SAR operation in the Sea of Japan.
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Critics
A few days after the joint SAR effort terminated on 19 April, the families of the 
crewmen who had perished, joined by fellow Navy pilots, gathered for simple, 
quiet memorial and prayer services. They were held under a “mild sun on the 
green, dandelion-speckled baseball field” of Naval Air Station Atsugi, Japan.135
Even before the services began, however, some Navy men began to voice anger 
over what they said was Washington’s failure to protect the crew of the recon-
naissance plane. Others expressed frustration over the Nixon administration’s 
decision to forgo a retaliatory strike against North Korea. President Nixon had 
castigated his predecessor for failing to retaliate after the North Korean seizure 
of USS Pueblo, yet Nixon did nothing more in retaliation following the EC-121 
downing than President Lyndon B. Johnson had done fifteen months earlier. Ac-
cording to a young naval officer interviewed by a reporter off base, “After it hap-
pened, every man in the [Air] Station wanted to go and zap the North Koreans 
with everything we had. . . . I suppose Nixon had his reasons, but we cannot help 
feeling badly that nothing was done.”136
As noted, when Nixon was asked whether the U.S. government believed the 
Soviets knew in advance of the North Korean plan to shoot down a U.S. recon-
naissance plane, he replied that U.S. intelligence indicated otherwise—but some 
Americans remained unconvinced. Soon after the EC-121 crisis began, the Rev-
erend Paul D. Lindstrom of Prospect Heights, Illinois, the national chairman of 
the Remember the Pueblo Committee, began making a number of extraordinary, 
unfounded claims. According to Lindstrom, “possibly seven” members of the 
EC-121 crew had survived and were picked up by North Korean gunboats, and 
a supposed four-hour delay in advising President Nixon of the shootdown had 
“brought about the failure to rescue the known survivors of the EC-121 who 
parachuted into the Sea of Japan.” Citing an unnamed U.S. government source, 
Reverend Lindstrom also claimed that the MiGs that shot down the EC-121 were 
based in the Soviet Union, not in North Korea—an accusation that Admiral Gro-
mov and others later denied.137
Any delay in responding to the incident, such as the one to which Lindstrom 
referred, might have been caused by Nixon being in a drunken state at the time. 
According to Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist Seymour M. Hersh, “Nixon had 
become violently drunk early in the crisis.”138
Other questions posed by those addressing the incident with a critical eye 
are more general in nature. Yes, after the Pueblo incident the Soviets allegedly 
warned the North Koreans to cease further acts of aggression against the United 
States; yes, when the EC-121 was brought down nonetheless, the Soviets assisted 
in the SAR operation. But when it came to their eagerness to help recover debris, 
was this entirely unselfish? When top secret documents, cryptologic equipment, 
29
Streifer and Sabitov: “Improbable Allies”—The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy EC-12
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 S T R E I F E R  &  S A B I T O V  1 3 3
and secret codes off USS Pueblo fell into Russian hands, the NSA had said it was 
“everyone’s worst nightmare, surpassing in damage anything that had ever hap-
pened to the cryptologic community.”139 Fifteen months later, if similar material 
that Soviet sailors collected after the EC-121 crash was photographed before its 
return or never returned at all, the damage to American cryptology would have 
been no less catastrophic.
Tucker and Dale recovered a few pieces of classified material, among which 
were a radar antenna, a classified photograph, pages from a computer printout, 
and several pages of handwritten operator’s notes found in the personal effects 
of Richard E. Sweeney. Also recovered was “a piece of the bulkhead containing 
the crew’s positions”; presumably this was a chart (attached to a piece of EC-121 
bulkhead) that showed where each crewman aboard the spy plane worked.140
In contrast, according to a top secret NSA report on the incident, no classi-
fied material was in the debris exchanged between Vdokhnovennyi and Tucker. 
When Soviet seaman Yuri Panachev was asked whether all technical books from 
the EC-121 were returned to the U.S. Navy, he replied, “We threw thick books 
into plastic sacks as well; if they were returned, I am not aware.”141 Meanwhile, a 
complete list of the classified material aboard the EC-121 continues to be with-
held from the public.142
Congress
In addition to coverage in the press and statements and press releases issuing 
from the executive branch, the U.S.-Soviet cooperative effort also was discussed 
in Congress. A special subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services 
already had been established and was conducting a full and thorough inquiry 
arising from the capture and internment of USS Pueblo and its crew by the North 
Korean government; its scope was expanded to include the loss of the EC-121.143 
Thus, the parallels between the January 1968 Pueblo incident and the April 1969 
downing of the EC-121 led to an expansion of the subcommittee’s authority.
During an appearance before the subcommittee in connection with the loss of 
the EC-121, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, provided a detailed 
account of the incident, including a fairly comprehensive discussion of the Soviet 
role in the SAR effort. General Wheeler noted to the subcommittee that “[t]he 
composition of the search and rescue force at various times subsequent to the loss 
of the EC-121 has been described in briefings and news releases.” He then went 
on to explain how two Soviet ships had joined the search, and that later a third 
ship, a destroyer, also was observed in the area. These three were the only Soviet 
ships known to have participated in the search. “Our search aircraft established 
contact with the Soviet ships,” Wheeler said.144
But whatever goodwill developed between the U.S. and Soviet navies during 
the joint operation was short-lived, and mutual suspicions between these Cold 
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War adversaries did not abate. Spurred by the Soviet Union’s expanding activities 
at sea, the U.S. Navy planned on stepping up and modernizing its intelligence 
operations around the world. Monies for an accelerated intelligence program 
were included in a large funding bill that was pending in the House and Senate 
in October 1969. Navy spokesmen stated that during their testimony behind 
closed doors they had urged that the sums be approved. Included in the Navy 
request was regular funding for “cloak-and-dagger intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities of nearly 1,000 agents operating around the world.” These 
activities ranged from sensitive espionage investigations to an increasing number 
of inquiries into Navy narcotics use. The proposed expansion was requested for 
surveillance on, over, and beneath the high seas; also involved were reports from 
visual sightings, as well as from radar, sound-sensitive sonobuoys, and other 
sophisticated sensors.145
Rear Admiral Frederick J. “Fritz” Harlfinger II, commander of Naval Intel-
ligence Command, told congressional committees that Russia’s new interest in 
sea power was largely responsible for the step-up in requests for congressional 
funding. Referring specifically to the penetration by the modern and expanding 
Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean over the preceding 
two years, Harlfinger said, “The urgent effort to improve Naval intelligence ca-
pabilities has been provoked primarily by the steady and continuing expansion 
of Soviet sea power.” The Soviets were showing “increasing competence” in using 
their modern ships and equipment, he said. “More Soviet ships and aircraft are 
going out to sea—going farther and staying out longer.”146
Over a decade later, an aspect of the incident again raised its head in con-
gressional debate. In 1983, Congress was debating a bill on national security; 
specifically, the House was debating further consideration of a bill (H.R. 3231) to 
revise the Export Administration Act of 1979.147 Although the MiG fighters that 
shot down the EC-121 were Soviet made, Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon 
(R-NY) claimed that the Atoll missiles that MiGs used were Soviet copies of 
American technology. An NSA report completed after the EC-121 incident had 
determined that the missiles that brought down the plane probably were of the 
infrared, heat-seeking, Atoll type—a Soviet reverse-engineered replica of the U.S. 
Sidewinder missile.148 Solomon, in his debate remarks, stated that he believed the 
Soviet practice of stealing Western technology that had led to the Atoll missile 
would continue unless the House passed the amendment to the bill currently un-
der debate. He was outraged that the House was being asked to vote on a bill that 
would make it easier for the Soviets to obtain U.S. missile technology. Solomon 
claimed there was a strong relationship between the national security sections of 
the bill and the recent “Korean airline massacre”—the September 1983 downing 
of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan. “At the same time, 
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we continue to search for the black box from the KAL destroyed by an Atoll mis-
sile. A Soviet missile which is an exact duplicate of the U.S. Sidewinder missile. 
The Soviet Atoll is a mirror image of U.S. technology and was built with Western 
methods, and Western know-how,” the congressman said.149
At the time of the attack, President Nixon was extremely grateful to the Soviet 
Union for helping in this SAR effort. However, we now know, on the basis of 
the recent testimony of Soviet participants, that the Soviets did not participate 
entirely unselfishly. Following the Pueblo seizure, the North Koreans had passed 
on to the Russians the state-of-the-art ELINT equipment on board that USN spy 
ship. Similarly, in the case of the EC-121 incident, the Russians transferred to 
Vladivostok a load of classified material—perhaps even before the first U.S. war-
ship had arrived on scene.
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